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Abstract—The Heterogeneous System Architecture (HSA)
Foundation has produced the HSA Platform System Architecture
Specification that goes a long way towards addressing the need
for a clear and consistent method for specifying weakly consistent
memory. A weakly-consistent memory model is one of the funda-
mental cornerstones for achieving high performance concurrency
with low power on mobile platforms. HSA is specified using a
natural language which makes it open to multiple ambiguous
interpretations and could thereby render bugs in implementations
of it in hardware and software. In this paper, we present a
formal model of HSA which can be used in the development and
verification of both concurrent software applications as well as in
the development and verification of the HSA-compliant platform
itself. We use the Event-B language to build a provably correct
hierarchy of models from the most abstract to a detailed refine-
ment of HSA that is close to implementation level. Our memory
models are general in the sense that they represent arbitrary
numbers of masters, programs and instruction interleavings and
we reason about such general models using theorem proving. By
using the Rodin tool for Event-B we are able to seamlessly model
and verify the entire hierarchy of models using proofs to establish
that each refinement is correct. We also define an automated
validation method that allows us to check baseline compliance of
the model against a suite of published HSA litmus test cases. Once
we have completed the model validation we develop a coverage
driven method to extract a richer set of test cases from the
formal Event-B model and a user specified coverage model. These
tests are then used for extensive regression testing of hardware
and software systems. We believe our methodology of refinement
based formal modelling, baseline compliance testing of the formal
model and coverage driven test extraction using a single language
of Event-B language and the Rodin tool is a completely new way
of addressing a profoundly important challenge facing the design
and verification of low-power of multi-core systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Weakly-consistent memory [1] is one of the fundamental
cornerstones for achieving high performance concurrency with
low power on mobile platforms. Although the buffering mech-
anisms that underly weakly consistent memory models are rel-
atively straightforward to understand, developing a high-level,
natural language specification that represents the behaviours of
all implementations is very difficult. This presents a challenge
to both software engineers, who wish to develop efficient, race-
free concurrent programs and for platform engineers who wish
to develop systems that conform to a particular memory model.
The Heterogeneous System Architecture (HSA) Foundation
is a not-for-profit industry standards body which has produced
the HSA Platform System Architecture Specification [2] that
goes a long way towards addressing the need for a clear and
consistent method for specifying weakly consistent memory,
but since it is still in natural language there is still a need
for a more formal representation. In this paper, we describe
how the HSA specification and the well-founded terminology
and concepts it describes, is used to develop a formal model
in Event-B [3] which can be used in the development and
verification of both concurrent software applications as well
as in the development and verification of the HSA-compliant
platform itself, the specific configuration of masters, slaves
and interconnect.
We use the Event-B [3] language to build a provably correct
hierarchy of models from the most abstract to a detailed
refinement of HSA that is close to implementation level. Our
memory models are general in the sense that they represent
arbitrary numbers of masters, programs and instruction in-
terleavings and we reason about such general models using
theorem proving. By using the Rodin tool for Event-B we
are able to seamlessly model and verify the entire hierarchy
of models using proofs to establish that each refinement is
correct. We also define an automated validation method that al-
lows us check baseline compliance of the model against a suite
of published HSA litmus test cases. The validation method
involves refining the general models to represent litmus tests
and uses model checking to verify that all possible interleaving
of a litmus test achieve the expected outcome. Once we
have completed the model validation we develop a coverage
driven method to extract a richer set of test cases from the
formal Event-B model and a user specified coverage model.
These tests are then used for extensive regression testing of
hardware and software systems. We believe our methodology
of refinement based formal modelling, baseline compliance
testing of the formal model and coverage driven test extraction
using a single language of Event-B language and the Rodin
tool is a completely new way of addressing a profoundly
important challenge facing the design and verification of low-
power of multi-core systems.
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II. EVENT-B BASED FORMAL MODELLING OF HSA
Event-B is a proof-based modelling language and method
that enables the systematic development of specifications using
a formal notion of refinement. The Rodin platform [3] is the
Eclipse-based IDE that provides automated support for Event-
B modelling, refinement and mathematical proof, model-
checking and model-based test generation.
Our approach starts at the abstract level, focusing on issue
and observation of memory instructions. In subsequent refine-
ments, we introduce set-theoretic relations on the memory
accesses which constrain the order in which they can be issued
or observed. At each refinement level we are able to verify
properties formally at their appropriate level of abstraction
and detailed instruction sets are introduced in correctness-
preserving refinement steps. This refinement-based approach
helps to manage complexity of the modelling and verification.
Using this modelling approach, we build a formal memory
model that represents an arbitrary set of masters running an
arbitrary set of program threads. We then use further Event-
B refinements to constrain the model to represent a fixed set
of masters, each executing a specific program thread. In this
way, we can represent a published HSA litmus test, together
with a property or set of properties which specify the desired
outcome of the test. We then use a combination of automatic
theorem proving, model checking and simulation to verify and
validate the formalised memory models against the formalised
litmus tests. Once we have completed the model validation we
develop a coverage driven method to extract a richer set of
test cases from the formal Event-B model and a user specified
coverage model. These tests can then be used for extensive
regression testing of hardware and software systems.
In Figure 1 below we show the Event-B model refinement
hierarchy. The abstract generic models are denoted by GMn,
where n ranges from 1 to 3 whilst the HSA-specific models
are denoted by HSAMn[ m] where n ranges from 4 upwards
and m represents a litmus test at the concrete level. The
abstract models, GM1 to GM3, are generic and can form the
foundation for modelling, for instance, Sequential Consistency
(SC) [4], Total Store Order (TSO) [5] or ARM [6] memory
models. In GM1 we define the fundamental memory accesses
with the events Issue and Observe, in GM2 we differentiate
between LOAD and STORE memory accesses and in GM3
we model the observation of the LOAD and STORE values.
In the next refinement, HSAM4, we model the ordering rules
for HSA atomics and FENCEs and in refinement HSAM5 we
model the registers generically. We then introduce a series of
refinements, HSAM6[1 .. m] to model a series of m concurrent
programs, the litmus tests, each running on a fixed set of
masters and use the ProB model checker [7] to validate the
model. Each of these models is then further refined, HSAM7[1
.. m] to introduce the functional coverage metric for coverage
measurement and test generation.
Once we have completed the model validation and have a set
of litmus tests which cover the model, we relax the constraints
on the litmus test models HSAM7[1 .. m] so that instead of
GM1	  
GM2	  
Abstract Issue and Observe     
GM3	  
LOAD and STORE       
Observed Values 
HSAM4	  
HSAM5	  
Load/Store Atomics, FENCEs 
Registers 
HSAM6_2	  
Litmus Test 2 
HSAM6_m	  
Litmus Test m 
HSAM6_1	  
Litmus Test 1 
HSAM7_2	  
TestGen/Coverage 2 
HSAM7_m	  
TestGen/Coverage m 
HSAM7_1	  
TestGen/Coverage 1 
Fig. 1. Model Refinement Hierarchy
each representing a single, fixed concurrent program, each
model represents a class of concurrent, synchronised pro-
grams, based on the litmus test, from which we can generate
tests automatically that can be used in the development and
verification of the HSA-compliant platform itself.
In summary, the contributions of this paper are:
• a hierarchy of formalised and verified memory models
with varying ordering constraints
• a method for validating models against known litmus tests
through model-checking
• a method for automatic generation of tests from a
constrained model for regression testing of an HSA-
compliant platform.
III. UNDERSTANDING HSA ORDERING
We develop a generalised approach to weakly consistent
memory modelling, based on HSA terminology, which pro-
vides the building blocks with which we can model weak
memory semantics with a single, consistent modelling frame-
work. We also provide at the concrete level a generalised nota-
tion for representing litmus tests and the invariants associated
with those tests.
We begin with a definition of load and store from the HSA
reference manual [2]. We focus our modelling around LOAD
and STORE operations that may be issued and observed by
different units of execution.
• For primitives of type store, visibility to unit of execution
A of a store operation X is when the data of store X is
available to loads from unit of execution A.
• For primitives of type load, visibility is when a load gets
the data that the unit of execution will put in the register.
We shall use the HSA definition as the basis for formalising
the specification of loads and stores.
P1	   P2	   P3	  
p1i1:	  	  	  	  S	  	  1,	  	  	  a1	   p2i1:	  	  	  	  L	  	  	  R1,	  	  	  a2	   p3i1:	  	  	  L	  	  	  R1,	  	  	  a1	  
p1i2:	  	  	  	  S	  	  1,	  	  	  a2	   p2i2:	  	  	  	  L	  	  	  R2,	  	  	  a1	   p3i2:	  	  	  L	  	  	  R2,	  	  	  a2	  
Fig. 2. Litmus test
A. Observation Ordering
Without considering synchronisation, based on the HSA
definition above, we define observation ordering, using the
litmus test of Figure 2 to illustrate the definitions. We assume
that the values at addresses a1 and a2 are initially set to 0
• A STORE is observed by any master when a subsequent
LOAD issued by that master would result in the LOAD
returning the value associated with the STORE
– The STOREs p1i1 and p1i2 are observed by masters
P1, P2, P3 in some order and these STORE observa-
tions with respect to the LOAD observations determine
the value which the LOADs observe.
• A LOAD is observed by the master issuing the LOAD
when the LOAD returns the value associated with the last
observed STORE to the LOAD’s address
– The LOADs p2i1 and p2i2 are observed by P2 in some
order; similary for the P3 LOADS.
Note that this definition of observation ordering does not
refer to values in registers. We use, instead, the more abstract
concept of a LOAD returning a value. We also use the term
observe [8] rather than the HSA visibility.
For Synchronisation, the ordering of STORE and LOAD
observations is constrained
1) An ordering is established between LOAD and STORE
observations when those LOADs and STOREs are issued
by a single master (e.g., program order). In Figure 3, the
arrow indicates the ordering of the LOADs on P2 and P3.
P1	   P2	   P3	  
p1i1:	  	  	  	  S	  	  1,	  	  	  a1	   p2i1:	  	  	  	  L	  	  	  R1,	  	  	  a2	   p3i1:	  	  	  L	  	  	  R1,	  	  	  a1	  
p1i2:	  	  	  	  S	  	  1,	  	  	  a2	  
p2i2:	  	  	  	  L	  	  	  R2,	  	  	  a1	   p3i2:	  	  	  L	  	  	  R2,	  	  	  a2	  
Fig. 3. Ordering between LOADs on the the same master
2) An ordering is established between LOAD observations
on different masters to the same address as shown in
Figure 4.
P1	   P2	   P3	  
p1i1:	  	  	  	  S	  	  1,	  	  	  a1	   p2i1:	  	  	  	  L	  	  	  R1,	  	  	  a2	   p3i1:	  	  	  L	  	  	  R1,	  	  	  a1	  
p1i2:	  	  	  	  S	  	  1,	  	  	  a2	  
p2i2:	  	  	  	  L	  	  	  R2,	  	  	  a1	   p3i2:	  	  	  L	  	  	  R2,	  	  	  a2	  
Fig. 4. Ordering between LOADs on different masters
3) An ordering is established between a STORE observation
by a given master and an observation of a LOAD by a
different master for the same address as shown by the
labelled arrow in Figure 5. P2 observes the STORE p1i2
before it observes the LOAD p2i1.
P1	   P2	   P3	  
p1i1:	  	  	  	  S	  	  1,	  	  	  a1	   p2i1:	  	  	  	  L	  	  	  R1,	  	  	  a2	   p3i1:	  	  	  L	  	  	  R1,	  	  	  a1	  
p1i2:	  	  	  	  S	  	  1,	  	  	  a2	  
p2i2:	  	  	  	  L	  	  	  R2,	  	  	  a1	   p3i2:	  	  	  L	  	  	  R2,	  	  	  a2	  
p2 
Fig. 5. Ordering between STOREs and LOADs on different masters
With these three orderings in place, the following outcome
is not possible:-
(p2:R1 = 1 and p2:R2 = 0 and p3:R1 = 1 and p3:R2 = 0)
For this outcome to occur would mean that
• p2i1 and p2i2 are observed in program order
• P2 must observe the LOAD p2i2 before P3 observes the
LOAD p3i1
• P3 must observe the LOAD p3i2 before P2 observes the
LOAD p2i1
• This ordering is invalid (cyclic), therefore the assumed
outcome is not possible, as shown in Figure 6.
P1	   P2	   P3	  
p1i1:	  	  	  	  S	  	  1,	  	  	  a1	   p2i1:	  	  	  	  L	  	  	  R1,	  	  	  a2	   p3i1:	  	  	  L	  	  	  R1,	  	  	  a1	  
p1i2:	  	  	  	  S	  	  1,	  	  	  a2	  
p2i2:	  	  	  	  L	  	  	  R2,	  	  	  a1	   p3i2:	  	  	  L	  	  	  R2,	  	  	  a2	  
Fig. 6. Invalid ordering
We now describe these three synchronisation orderings,
using the definitions of Program Order (po), Coherent Order
(co) and Happens Before Order (hb), as defined in the HSA
specification. For po, there is a total sequential order on
operations within a single unit of execution, for co, there
is a total apparent order on all synchronisation operations
consistent with po and hb must be consistent with each co
and with all SC orders.
We illustrate these orderings using the same litmus test.
B. LOADs and STOREs Observed in Program Order (po)
Memory accesses from the same master are observed in
the order they are issued by all masters.
Figure 3 illustrates po on masters P2 and P3.
C. Coherent Observation of LOADs/STOREs per Master (co)
If a master observes a STORE followed by a LOAD for the
same memory address, then the value it reads in the LOAD
is the value defined in the STORE.
Figure 4 illustrates co between masters P2 and P3.
D. Happens Before ordering of Load observations (hb)
Finally, we introduce the Happens Before ordering. This
is an ordering between loads defined by a combination of
coherent orderings on loads and stores to the same address,
i.e., if a load L1 from an address A is observed before a store
S1 to A and load L2 is observed after S1 by some master, then
L1 is observed before L2 by all masters. (See 7.)
P1	   P2	   P3	  
p1i1:	  	  	  	  S	  	  1,	  	  	  a1	   p2i1:	  	  	  	  L	  	  	  R1,	  	  	  a2	   p3i1:	  	  	  L	  	  	  R1,	  	  	  a1	  
p1i2:	  	  	  	  S	  	  1,	  	  	  a2	  
p2i2:	  	  	  	  L	  	  	  R2,	  	  	  a1	   p3i2:	  	  	  L	  	  	  R2,	  	  	  a2	  
p2 p3 
Fig. 7. Happens Before (hb)
E. Synchronisation Mechanisms for Weakly Consistent Mem-
ory
Using these notions of observation ordering, po, co, and hb,
we can now define the mechanisms by which synchronisation
can be achieved. First, we look at the case of No Synchroni-
sation for weakly consistent memory
1) No Synchronisation: If no fences or specific synchro-
nising instructions are used, then the only ordering is co, as
shown in Figure 2. No synchronisation means that stores are
observed by different masters in different order.
2) Synchronising Memory Accesses (Single Memory Loca-
tion): HSA supports atomic synchronizing operations with ac-
quire and release semantics and are, by definition, Sequentially
Consistent. The operations apply to a single memory location.
These synchronising LOADs and STOREs, represented as
SL and SS in Figure 8, result in po, co and hb observation
orderings. SL and SS instructions impose po and hb ordering.
P1	   P2	   P3	  
p1i1:	  	  	  	  SS	  	  1,	  	  	  a1	   p2i1:	  	  	  	  SL	  	  	  R1,	  	  	  a2	   p3i1:	  	  	  SL	  	  	  R1,	  	  	  a1	  
p1i2:	  	  	  	  SS	  	  1,	  	  	  a2	   p2i2:	  	  	  	  SL	  	  	  R2,	  	  	  a1	   p3i2:	  	  	  SL	  	  	  R2,	  	  	  a2	  
Fig. 8. Synchronising Memory Accesses
3) Fences (Multiple Memory Locations in the same Scope):
Instead of using synchronising memory accesses, we can
introduce a FENCE instruction between the LOADs on P3
and P4 as shown in Figure 9. The introduction of the FENCE
also results in po, co and hb observation orderings. Whereas
the LOAD and STORE atomics only apply to a single memory
location, the FENCE applies to all memory locations within
the same defined scope, as described in the HSA specification.
P1	   P2	   P3	  
p1i1:	  	  	  	  S	  	  1,	  	  	  a1	   p2i1:	  	  	  	  L	  	  	  R1,	  	  	  a2	   p3i1:	  	  	  L	  	  	  R1,	  	  	  a1	  
p1i2:	  	  	  	  S	  	  1,	  	  	  a2	   P2i2:	  	  	  	  FENCE	   P3i2:	  	  	  FENCE	  
p2i3:	  	  	  	  L	  	  	  R2,	  	  	  a1	   p3i3:	  	  	  L	  	  	  R2,	  	  	  a2	  
Fig. 9. Fence Synchronisation
IV. MODELLING WEAK MEMORY WITH EVENT-B
We begin with an abstract, highly nondeterministic model
of memory accesses. The abstract Event-B context defines a
set of transactions, TRN and a subset of the transactions which
are memory accesses, MEMACCESS.
axm1 : MEMACCESS ⊆ TRN
We assume a set of masters that issue transactions on a
shared memory space and the effect of those transactions is
observed some time after they are issued. Key to defining weak
memory models is the relative ordering, locally and globally,
of transaction issues and observations. For this reason, we start
our modelling with the key events in weak memory systems,
Issue transaction and Observe transaction.
We therefore define an abstract Event-B machine, GM1,
with two events, Issue and Observe, which operate on memory
accesses.
inv1 : issued ⊆MEMACCESS
inv2 : observed ⊆ issued
Event Issue =̂
any
ma
where
grd1 : ma ∈MEMACCESS
grd2 : ma /∈ issued
then
act1 : issued := issued ∪ {ma}
end
Event Observe =̂
any
ma
where
grd1 : ma ∈ issued
then
act1 : observed := observed ∪ {ma}
end
The variable issued, invariant inv1, initialised to the empty
set, records the issuing of each memory access by the event
Issue. The parameter ma of the event Issue represents a
memory access, the first guard, grd1, ensures that the memory
access cannot be re-issued if it has already been issued and
ma is added to the issued set by the action act1.
The variable observed, invariant inv2 is defined as a subset
of the memory accesses that have been issued. If the set issued
is not empty, the event Observe chooses an issued memory
access non-deterministically from the set and the action act1
adds it to the set observed. At this early stage there is no notion
of a program. Memory accesses are issued in some arbitrary
order, and once issued they can be observed repeatedly in some
arbitrary order.
We then refine the abstract model to differentiate between
LOAD and STORE accesses,
axm2 : partition(MEMACCESS, STORE,LOAD)
and refine the abstract events Issue and Observe.
• New events IssueLoad and IssueStore refine Issue
• New events ObserveLoad and ObserveStore refine Ob-
serve
In the next refinement, we introduce an abstraction of
the memory architecture, which makes reasoning about weak
memory consistency tractable[8]. Each master keeps track in-
dividually of its last observed STORE value for each memory
location. When a LOAD is observed, the last observed value
for that master is written to the master’s target register.
An observation ordering is then established between LOADs
and STOREs, depending on address, control and data depen-
dencies and the positioning of fences.
The abstract architecture is shown in Figure 10, where each
Memory i represents the last observed STORE value of each
memory location for each individual Master i.
MASTER 1 
Memory 1 
store load 
MASTER 2 
Memory 2 
store load 
MASTER n 
Memory n 
store load 
Abstract Memory Sub-system 
Fig. 10. Abstract Memory Architecture
This architecture is represented in Event-B with the variable
lov.
inv1 : lov ∈MASTER→ (ADDR→ V ALUE)
which maintains the last observed value.
We also introduce the variable observers, which associates
each memory access with the masters which have observed
that access.
inv2 : observers ∈MEMACCESS 7→ P(MASTER)
For each LOAD or STORE that is issued, observers(s) is
initialised to the empty set.
The refined event ObserveStore introduces a new guard,
grd3, to ensure that this master, m, has not already observed
this store, s, an action, act2, which updates the last observed
value for m, using the relational override operator, and an
action, act3, which adds m to the observers of s.
Event ObserveStore =̂
refines ObserveStore
any
s,m
where
grd1 : s ∈ issued
grd2 : s ∈ STORE
grd3 : m /∈ observers(s)
then
act1 : observed := observed ∪ {s}
act2 : lov(m) := lov(m)C− {addr(s) 7→ val(s)}
act3 : observers(s) := observers(s) ∪ {m}
end
We now have a generic, abstract model which can now be
refined to implement HSA Atomics and Fences.
A. Modelling HSA Fence Synchronisation
Using the definitions of po, co and hb from the HSA
specification, we are able to model the observation orderings
necessary to implement fence synchronisation. We introduce
the variable ahead to represent the accesses that are ahead
of the fence and the variable after to represent the set of
LOADs that are observed after a given STORE. Our refine-
ment distinguishes multiple cases of LOAD observation, each
of which is represented by an event that refines our abstract
ObserveLoad event. First, we specify the LOAD observations
in the presence of a FENCE. There are two cases to address,
the load happening before a store and happening after a store.
ObserveLoadHappensBeforeWithFence: If the master that
issued the LOAD has issued a FENCE and if the LOAD is not
ahead of the FENCE in program order, then all other memory
accesses ahead of the FENCE in program order must have
been observed (guard grd7 below). This LOAD is observed
before a corresponding STORE to the same location (guards
grd9, grd10) and no other LOAD has observed that STORE
and there is therefore no LOAD after the STORE (guard
grd11).
• LOADs are observed in Program Order(po)
• LOAD is observed before a corresponding STORE
• No other LOAD has been observed after the STORE
• po + co + hb
The event is specified as follows:
Event ObserveLoadHappensBeforeWithFence =̂
extends ObserveLoad
any
l,m, f, s
where
grd1 : l ∈ issued
grd2 : l ∈ LOAD
grd3 : m /∈ observers(l)
grd4 : m = issuer(l)
grd5 : f ∈ issuedfence
grd6 : m = issuer(f)
grd7 : l /∈ ahead(f)⇒
(∀a·a ∈ ahead(f) ∧ a ∈ dom(observers)⇒
m ∈ observers(a))
grd8 : s ∈ STORE
grd9 : address(s) = address(l)
grd10 : m /∈ observers(s)
grd11 : after(s) = ∅
then
act1 : observed := observed ∪ {l}
act2 : observers(l) := observers(l) ∪ {m}
end
ObserveLoadAfterStoreWithFence: If the master that issued
the LOAD has issued a FENCE and if the LOAD is not
ahead of the FENCE in program order, then all other memory
accesses ahead of the FENCE in program order must have
been observed (guard grd7). The master has observed a
corresponding STORE to the same location (guard grd11).
• In Program Order
• LOAD is observed after a corresponding STORE
• po + co
The event is specified as follows:
Event ObserveLoadAfterStoreWithFence =̂
extends ObserveLoad
any
l,m, f, s
where
grd1 : l ∈ issued
grd2 : l ∈ LOAD
grd3 : m /∈ observers(l)
grd4 : m = issuer(l)
grd5 : f ∈ issuedfence
grd6 : m = issuer(f)
grd7 : l /∈ ahead(f)⇒
(∀a·a ∈ ahead(f) ∧ a ∈ dom(observers)⇒
m ∈ observers(a))
grd8 : s ∈ issued
grd9 : s ∈ STORE
grd10 : address(s) = address(l)
grd11 : m ∈ observers(s)
then
act1 : observed := observed ∪ {l}
act2 : observers(l) := observers(l) ∪ {m}
act3 : after(s) := after(s) ∪ {l}
end
Similarly, we specify the two cases of LOAD observation
without a FENCE covering loads before and after a store.
We also specify an IssueFence event. Details of these are
straightforward and are ommited for brevity.
B. Modelling the HSA Atomics
Again, using the definitions of po, co and hb from the HSA
specification, we are now able to model the HSA atomics.
First, we define the atomic LOAD, SCACQLOAD, with
acquire semantics and the atomic STORE, SCRELSTORE with
release semantics, and differentiate them from the ordinary
LOADs and STOREs.
As we did to model fences, above, we then refine the events
of the generic model to establish this differentiation, imposing
the ordering defined in the HSA specification in the follow-
ing, refinedIssue events, IssueAtomicSCACQLoad, IssueLoad,
IssueAtomicSCRELStore, IssueStore and their corresponding
Observe events.
C. Introducing the Register File
We have a model which implements fences and atomics,
which can be refined to introduce the register file as an Event-
B variable, rf
inv1 : rf ∈MASTER 7→ (REG→ V ALUE)
When a LOAD, l, is observed by a master, m, the register
r associated with l, rl, takes the last observed value for
that LOAD location, addr(l). For instance, in the event Ob-
serveLoadHappensBeforewithFence described above, an extra
action, act3 is added.
act3 : rf(m) := rf(m)C− {r(l) 7→ (lov(m))(addr(l))}
V. VALIDATING THE MEMORY MODEL
A. A Notation for Representing Litmus Tests
The memory model we have developed represents all the
legal interleavings of an arbitrary set of programs running on
an arbitrary set of masters. We now wish to constrain the
model to represent a litmus test - all possible interleavings for
a fixed set of masters each running a specific, fixed program
thread.
To make it easier to verify litmus tests, we introduce a tool-
supported notation with which the litmus test and the invariant
can be represented and an Event-B context and invariant is
generated automatically from this description. An example of
a litmus test in our notation as shown in Figure 11.
p1: 
 st 1, a1 
 st 1, a2 
p2: 
 ld r1, a1 
 fence 
 ld r2, a2 
p3: 
 ld r1, a2 
 fence 
 ld r2, a1 
 
 
outcome: not(p2.r1 = 1 and p3.r1 = 1 and p2.r2 = 0 and p3.r2 = 0)    
Fig. 11. Litmus Test in Tool-supported Notation
B. The Litmus Test Context
We constrain the memory model by introducing axioms
which specify the litmus test instructions, where for instance
I11 is a STORE of the value 1 to the address a1, and the
program threads that will run those instructions.
axm10 : P1 = {1 7→ I11, 2 7→ I12}
axm11 : P2 = {1 7→ I21, 2 7→ I22, 3 7→ I23}
axm12 : P3 = {1 7→ I31, 2 7→ I32, 3 7→ I33}
We then associate each thread with the appropriate master.
axm19 : PROGRAM = {M1 7→ P1,M2 7→ P2,M3 7→ P3}
C. Verifying the Litmus Test Outcome
An outcome statement may be associated with the Litmus
Test, which is represented as a boolean expression in terms of
the values in the registers of the masters. We specify outcome
to mean the values in the registers when all litmus test loads
have been observed. An invariant is generated that we verify
using the ProB model checker. In the case of this litmus test,
the invariant is
inv1 : {I21, I23, I31, I33} ⊆ observed⇒
¬((rf(M2))(R1) = V 1 ∧ (rf(M3))(R1) = V 1 ∧
((rf(M2))(R2) = V 0 ∧ (rf(M3))(R2) = V 0))
If the loads, I21, I23, I31, I33 issued by the masters M2 and
M3 have been observed, then the registers associated with the
masters cannot contain the prohibited outcome. The values V0
and V1 represent logic 0 and 1 respectively.
D. Covering the Allowable Register Value Combinations
The facility to specify and verify the illegal litmus test out-
comes formally is valuable, but to ensure thorough verification,
it is necessary to go further.
• To ensure that all the legal outcomes of the litmus test
are reachable.
• To ensure that the set of litmus tests cover the model
functionality.
We introduce a further refinement of the memory model to
introduce a functional coverage metric for the litmus test.
The relation coverage
inv1 : coverage ∈ REGCOV ER↔REGCOV ER
represents the combinations of register values that are reached
by the litmus test, where REGCOVER is defined in extended
context thus:
axm1 : C0 = {R1 7→ V 0, R2 7→ V 0}
axm2 : C1 = {R1 7→ V 0, R2 7→ V 1}
axm3 : C2 = {R1 7→ V 1, R2 7→ V 0}
axm4 : C3 = {R1 7→ V 1, R2 7→ V 1}
axm5 : REGCOV ER = {C0, C1, C2, C3}
Each constant Cn represents a register combination value for a
master and REGCOVER is the set of all register combinations
for a master. The coverage relation is initialised to the empty
set. The refinement then introduces a new event CoverRegis-
terValues
Event CoverRegisterValues =̂
any
rm2, rm3
where
grd1 : rm2 ∈ REGCOV ER
grd2 : rm3 ∈ REGCOV ER
grd3 : rf(M2) = rm2
grd4 : rf(M3) = rm3
grd5 : rm2 7→ rm3 /∈ coverage
grd6 : {I21, I23, I31, I33} ⊆ observed
then
act1 : coverage := coverage ∪ {rm3 7→ rm4}
end
This event is enabled when all the LOADs have been
observed (guard grd6) and when this combination of the
master register values has not already been covered (guard
grd5). The combination is then added to the coverage relation.
We can now re-run the model checker exhaustively to show,
not only that illegal register combinations are never reached
but also that all legal combinations are reachable. The ProB
model checker has a coverage option that now allows us to
display the values of the relation coverage that are covered.
Coverage point 15 represents the initial value of the cover-
age relation. Note that otherwise all 15 possible combinations
have been covered and the illegal combination is not covered.
E. Generating a Test for each Coverage Point
Now that we are sure that each legal combination of
registers is reachable, we wish to create a regression test
for each of the 15 reachable combinations. Creating the tests
manually is time consuming. ProB provides a model-checking-
based test generation facility which can be used to generate
these tests automatically.
First, we specify a predicate to define the target state. For
instance, if we wish to show that all the registers of both
masters can take the value 0 when all the LOADs have been
observed, then we specify.
I21, I23, I31, I33 ⊆ observed => C0 7→ C0 : coverage
Second, we specify the event or events which we wish
to be covered by the test. In this case, we just specify the
CoverRegisterValues event to guide the search.
ProB generates the tests as an HTML file, which can be
translated to suit the tool chain. One of the tests that ProB
generates is shown in Figure 12 below. The test describes
a sequence of six Issue instructions which results in the
expected register value combination to be recorded by the
event CoverRegisterValues.
Test_case_id = 1
IssueLoad(I21, P2);
IssueLoad(I31, P3);
IssueFence(I22, P2);
IssueLoad(I23, P2);
IssueFence(I32, P3);
IssueLoad(I33, P3);
CoverRegisterValues(rm2(R1->0, R2->0),
rm3(R1->0, R2->0) );
Fig. 12. Generated Test
F. Measuring the Coverage of a set of Litmus Tests
Since the litmus tests each target a particular aspect of the
weak memory model, an individual litmus test will not cover
all of the events of the model. What we do want to know,
however, is that all events of the model are covered by the set
of litmus tests. In other words, that the litmus tests fully cover
the model functionality.
We return to the tests generated above and now, instead of
specifying the CoverRegisterValues event, we specify all the
events that we expect to be covered by the test. We want
to verify that these and only these events are covered by
the litmus test. ProB will now generate several tests for the
required outcome which cover the events specified.
G. Generating additional Litmus Tests
Once we have completed the model validation and have a set
of litmus tests which cover the model, we relax the constraints
on our formalised litmus tests so that each model represents a
class of programs with a non-deterministic mix of instructions
(and the same set of masters, registers and address space as the
associated litmus). Using the ProB test generator, we are able
to generate automatically a wide range of tests, with expected
register values, which can be used for regression testing of the
HSA-compliant platform itself.
VI. RELATED WORK AND CONCLUSION
An overview of memory ordering and barriers in modern
microprocessors is presented in [9] and[10]. The release
consistency model is described in [11]. The notion of using
thread-local re-ordering and store atomicity, together with
the definition of an abstract architecture to support weakly
consistent memory specification is developed in [8] and [12].
The tutorial [13], for ARM and POWER memory models,
builds on the notion of an abstract machine architecture to
define a storage subsystem which has general applicability
for weakly consistent memory specification. [14] introduces
the notion of modelling concurrency with partial orders. [15]
presents an axiomatic approach to POWER memory modelling
and [16] presents a class of relaxed memory models which
are parameterised to support different local re-orderings and
store atomicity relaxation. [6] provides a clear description of
the ARM memory model and the HSA initiative to harmonise
heterogenous computing concepts [2] has resulted in a natural
language specification of fences and atomics which provides
considerable clarity for programmers, model and system de-
velopers.
In [17], an axiomatic approach is used where the mem-
ory model is represented as a directed graph, the nodes
representing the memory accesses and the arcs the ordering
between those accesses. Our Event-B approach is based on
the computation model of guarded atomic actions. Memory
access ordering is specified axiomatically as guards on events,
which model the memory accesses themselves, for instance
IssueRead, ObserveWrite. If more than one event is enabled,
then a choice is made non-deterministically, naturally repre-
senting the non-determinism of the memory model. The Event-
B model is operational in the sense that it is based on the
highly abstract memory architecture described in [8]. We begin
with a generic model to represent the ordering at a high level
of abstraction and then use formal refinement to introduce, in
steps, as much detail as is necessary to represent a concrete,
concurrent program, where the state of the registers and the
values observed by each of the masters are updated by the
event actions. The concrete model can therefore be mapped
directly to a Transaction-Level Model (TLM) for efficient
system simulation. [17] also presents a tool for simulation
and testing of memory models. Using ProB we can simulate
and test our Event-B models at each level of abstraction as
well as generate coverage-driven tests for regression testing
of hardware and software systems.
We believe our methodology of refinement based formal
modelling, baseline compliance testing of the formal model
and coverage driven test extraction using a single language of
Event B language and the Rodin tool is a completely new way
of addressing a profoundly important challenge facing the
design and verification of low-power of multi-core systems.
It provides a hierarchy of models where the complexity
of modelling is managed by refinement leading to clarity
in understanding and precision of formal modelling. Using
the same Event B model on which we have shown that
refinements are provably correct, we can test it for litmus test
compliance against published HSA litmus tests. The key here
is that testing for compliance is embedded within the Rodin
framework where proof based refinement is done; leading to
a very tight integration of testing and proofs. By relaxing
the constraints of HSA litmus tests we are able to explore
a much bigger space of tests and by a natural extension of
the core Event B model of the HSA by a coverage event
we are able to generate a bigger set of regression tests that
satisfy the coverage model. This is again done on the same
core Event B model on which proof based refinements were
done. The tests generated can be used in the development
and verification of the HSA-compliant platform itself.
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